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in providing a more coherent and consistent empirical examination of trade and FDI in relation to economic development.
Examinations of trade and productivity have recently begun to focus on imported intermediate goods, in contrast to the earlier emphasis on exporting as a driver of productivity and growth (e.g., Goldberg et al., 2009) . Clearly, the nature of this trade is partly related to patterns of FDI, to the extent that it is driven by trade fragmentation or vertical specialization (though it need not be). These studies are typically micro-level analyses, using plant or firm level data, and do not consider the role of FDI. Again, our approach allows us to explore the possible linkages between FDI and trade fragmentation in an empirically consistent manner.
1
Our central empirical tool is the Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007) index of export productivity (also used by Rodrik, 2006) , called EXPY. The precise index is described in Section III. This index measures the extent to which the export pattern of a country reflects the export of goods that have productivity levels that can be associated with higher income countries. We follow Hausmann et al. (2007) in examining the behavior of this index over time, and its relationship to per capita GDP. Our contribution here is to extend their approach to a longer time period for a specific set of countries.
We go on to adapt the EXPY index to measure the productivity level of imports. This is an innovation that allows us to examine how the other side of trade flows can matter, and also connects more directly to the role and impact of inward FDI. We are able to divide imports into intermediates and other goods, allowing us to distinguish their different possible roles in development, as well as different possible relationships to FDI. In sum, our approach allows us to examine the productivity patterns of exports and imports in relation to income levels and FDI flows.
Our empirical contribution can be viewed in the light of the ongoing debate about the role of trade (and government policy toward trade and industry) in the East Asian miracle:
The East Asian Miracle (World Bank 1993a) …study puts strong emphasis on the importance of performance in manufactured goods exports. The study goes beyond simply arguing that rapid export growth played an important role in permitting East Asian economies to avoid foreign exchange constraints. It suggests that exports and export policies played a crucial role in stimulating growth. The authors challenge the view that simply striving for a neutral incentive structure was adequate. Instead, they advocate broad government support for exports as a "highly effective way of enhancing absorption of international best practice technology [and] thus boosting productivity and output growth."… Although the study emphasizes exports as a channel for learning and technological advancement, conspicuously absent is a discussion of the role of imports and import competition in providing similar benefits. (Lawrence and Weinstein, 2001, pp. 379-80) In their study, Lawrence and Weinstein examine aggregate time-series data for Japan and Korea to make the case for the importance of imports in the two countries' growth experience. Again, our contribution differs in that we are able to take a more disaggregated view of trade, examine its productivity level and patterns of fragmentation, and correlate it with FDI flows. We also consider a larger sample of countries, giving a sense of patterns more in keeping with the intent of the East Asian miracle study.
The scope of our study is the eight economies considered in the World Bank (1993) study, augmented by the two emerging giants, China and India. Data limitations dictate the period that we use, 1984-2000 (with a couple of exceptions). This period captures the latter part of the East Asian miracle, as well as significant portions of the transitions of China and India toward being more open to foreign trade and capital, as well as domestically more marketoriented. In section II, we provide an overview of some aspects of these economies' experience during the period in question. Section III describes our data and methodology in some detail.
Since we use data from several sources, necessitated by our conceptual scope as well as changes in data categories over the period in question, preparing the data requires some care. We also explain our indices of trade "quality," based on Hausmann et al. (2007) tends to be higher for more developed (respectively, less developed) Asian countries in our sample.Section V provides a summary conclusion.
II. Historical Overview
The well documented East Asian economic "miracle" is probably best appreciated by observing the growth in GDP per capita in the region. The countries examined all saw impressive growth in GDP per capita (see Figure II .1). PPP converted GDP per capita increased at an average annual growth rate (AAGR) of 4.2 percent in the 1984-2000 period. There was significant convergence in the region, a result of Japan's stagnation and the high growth experienced by the Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan) and China.
In terms of GDP per capita, the fastest growing countries were China (7.6 percent), South Korea (6.5 percent), and Taiwan (6.1 percent); the slowest growing countries were Japan (2.1 percent), Indonesia (3.0 percent), and India (3.2 percent). The Asian financial crisis had a significant effect on these economies, but China and the Asian Tigers were able to recover fairly quickly. This pattern continued and, even, accelerated in the post-2000 period, though we do not analyze that more recent experience in this paper.
[ Figure II .1 about here]
Trade, especially trade in manufacturing, appears to have played significant role in this growth. We focus on manufactured goods because it allows us to exclude commodities, which have a different role to play in development and industrialization. In all cases, total exports and imports grew at much faster rates than that of the GDP per capita. China experienced the fastest growth in both exports and imports (19 and 21 percent, respectively) and the slowest growing economies were Japan (7 percent each, respectively) and Indonesia (7 and 6 percent, respectively). Manufacturing trade, especially for exports, played a crucial role in this growth (see Table II .1). Manufactures grew at faster rates than overall trade. As can be seen in Table   II .1, most of the countries in the sample experienced significant increases in the share of manufactures in overall merchandise trade. The only decreases were minor (Hong Kong, -1 percent, and Japan -0.4 percent), and occurred in countries had had very high shares in manufacturing at the beginning of the period.
There were a few noticeable drops in the share of manufacturing in imports over the period of analysis. For example, the share of manufactures in imports decreased in India (because of the increased importance of uncut/un-mounted diamonds, which the UNCTAD classification does not consider to be manufacturing), China (because of the increase in petroleum imports), and Indonesia (also because of the large increase in petroleum imports) .
Manufacturing exports in China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan accounted for more than 90 percent of all exports by 2000. Indonesia had the lowest share (56 percent) and Japan had the highest share (96 percent). On the import side, only Indonesia (61 percent), India (35 percent), Japan (56 percent), and Korea (61 percent) had shares lower than 75 percent. Although the share of manufacturing is not as high on the import side, the growth in share was in the double digits for most of the countries. Japan had the largest increase in the share of imported manufactures (33 percentage points), but it had the smallest share at the beginning of the period (23 percent).
[ For imports, the importance of intermediates in manufacturing decreased from 1984 until about the mid-1990s. They subsequently increased in importance, but, in many cases, had not recovered by 2000, or were at about the same level, as in the early 1980s. The largest decrease was of less than 11 percentage points (Japan). The only countries to increase the share of intermediates in imports over the period were India, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand.
Intermediate imports were, nevertheless, important and account for over 40 percent of all imports for all of the Asian countries in our sample. Characterizing the changes in intermediates in manufacturing exports is more difficult to generalize about, because some countries saw the percentage share of intermediates decrease by double digits, while for other countries the share increased by double digits. The largest drop in intermediates' exports share was almost 20 percent (India) and the highest increase was 29 percent (Taiwan). Interestingly, Japan and the Asian Tigers increased their share, while the rests of the countries (including China) saw decreases. This is consistent with several studies that looked at intermediates and found that the share of intermediates in trade has decreased (Hummels et al., 2001 ). However, looking at the share of intermediate manufactures trade ignores the fact that not all intermediates are the same.
The drop in the share of intermediates in the 1980s was a result of a drop in the importance of relatively low-tech intermediates (such as fabrics), while the increase in the 1990s was a result of increases in the importance of relatively higher-tech intermediates (such as electronic microcircuits). We quantify this difference in relative technological level embodied in each country's imports and exports in the next section. 
III. Data and Methodology
The trade, GDP, and FDI data each comes from a separate source. We use trade data compiled and standardized by Feenstra, Lipsey, Deng, Ma, and Mo (2005) . The data contain bilateral trade data for 1962-2000, classified as Standard International Trade Classification, revision 2 (SITC, Rev. 2) and disaggregated at the four-digit level. The bilateral data is aggregated to create multilateral data, which is what we use in our analysis. 4 The pre-1984 data were originally classified by SITC Rev.1 and had to be converted to SITC Rev. 2 by the authors;
to avoid any concordance issues, we will only focus on the data beginning in 1984 and ending in 2000. 5 We should note that the data excludes SITC four-digit categories that did not exceed $100,000 per year. The PPP adjusted GDP per capita data are from the Penn World Tables The calculations required two concordances: SITC to manufacturing and SITC to BEC.
First, to determine which SITC products are classified as manufacturing, we used UCTAD's definition for manufacturing. 6 Second, to determine which SITC goods were intermediates and which were "other goods", we used the UN's classification by Broad Economic Categories (BEC), which allows us to separate the data into intermediates, consumption, capital, and not classified (see Table III .1). The BEC concordance is in SITC Rev. 3, while the trade data is in SITC Rev. 2. As a result we ended up with three trade categories: Intermediate, Others, and
Mixed. "Mixed" refers to categories that include both intermediate and other goods in the different SITC revisions, and it tends to be a fairly small and consistent category (the data can be provided upon request). The share of goods classified as Mixed varied significantly, but was between 8 (Malaysia) and 25 (China) percent of total exports and between 16 (Singapore) and 23
(Taiwan) percent of total imports. Including Mixed as intermediates or as "others" did not change our results much and we chose to leave the "mixed" trade data out of the current analysis.
The trade in the categories used in our analysis still accounts for at a minimum of three-fourths of aggregate trade.
[ Table III .
about here]
To analyze the role of different aspects of trade in the Asian development success, we make use of Hausmann et al.'s (2007) framework to establish a hierarchy in goods in terms of their implied productivity. The quantitative index requires two steps.
Step 1 is to rank the traded goods in terms of their implied productivity. They refer to this measure as PRODY and it is calculated by taking a weighted average of the per-capita GDP of a product's exporters. The weights used are the revealed comparative advantage of each county in that commodity. As PRODY gives the "income/productivity level" of a commodity, the higher the PRODY, the higher the average income level of its exporters. We define good i's share of total exports by country j as ∑ and good i's share of total imports by country j as ∑ , where is the value of export i by country j and is the value of import i by country j. Thus, ∑ & ∑ are total manufacturing exports and imports, respectively. The formula for PRODY is:
Step 2 is to calculate the average "income/productivity level" for each country's trade basket. Hausmann et al. refer to this measurement for exports as EXPY and note that it measures "…the productivity level associated with a country's specialization pattern." Since we are also looking at the import side we calculate two productivity level variables EXPY and IMPY. They are the weighted sum of the PRODY for each country. The weights are, respectively, the share of each good in country j's total exports and total imports in manufacturing. Therefore, in our analysis, we have introduced IMPY as the import analogue of EXPY. The two measures are calculated using the following formulas:
Note that, since we are using PRODY as a measurement for the productivity level, we use PRODY created from exporters to calculate both EXPY for exports and IMPY for imports.
Hausmann et al. chose to compare the implied productivity at a point in time across different countries (with varying GDP per capita). For example, Hausmann et al. find that "EXPY is a strong robust predictor of subsequent economic growth, controlling for standard covariates." They also find that, compared to the world average, India and China are outliers.
We, on the other hand, examine a relatively small number of countries and see how trade patterns in these countries have evolved over time, compared to each other. We also examine different types of exports, imports, and FDI inflows in tracing the evolution of these trade patterns.
IV. Results
In this section we analysis and compare the EXPY and IMPY in manufacturing for the It is interesting to note that China, India, Thailand, Malaysia, and, to a lesser extent, Indonesia appear to be in a different group when comparing EXPY and IMPY with GDP per 7 Our results with respect to intermediate imports may also be seen as complementing analyses of the development impacts of trade in capital goods, such as Eaton and Kortum (2001) and Alfaro and Hammel (2007) .
capita (See Figure IV. Since intermediates have not increased as fast as other goods for several of the countries in the sample (see Section II, and Table II. 2), the fact that EXPY and IMPY have increased means than the composition of intermediates has changed substantially. Since the changes in composition have tended towards more high-tech intermediates, these products are the ones that have tended to benefit from the lower trade costs and the various government policies. Finally, with trade fragmentation, it is conceivable that some of the increases in EXPY are due to increased IMPY, since export upgrading is based on importing more complex intermediate goods. The iPod, a product "made" in China, is a clear example of this (Linden, Dedrick, and Kraemer, 2011) .
8 In order to make the figures intelligible, we do not display the data for every year, but only for the first, middle and last years of the sample. 9 For an example, see Swenson (2011) . Nonetheless, it is also clear that the EXPY has increased at impressive rates for exports (see Figures IV.5 and IV.6). This applies to both intermediates and others. These figures appear to show that all the countries are converging towards one point for intermediates. China, India, and Indonesia have the lowest EXPY at the end of the period, but these were also the countries with the fastest growing EXPY. The increase in EXPY for "other goods" exports is quite large (five countries increased EXPY by at least 5,000 US$). It is no wonder that this increase in productivity level has been noticed, even in the popular press. 10 There are some exceptions;
China, Indonesia, Hong Kong, and Japan had relatively little or no growth in EXPY for this category. However, the reasons for this lack of growth are very different among this subgroup. In particular, Japan had the largest EXPY at the beginning of the period, and was still in the top three by the end of the period. Although China, Indonesia, and Hong Kong may not have increased as much as the others, they have managed to match the rest of the sample countries in their EXPY for intermediate exports.
[ Figure How is it that the EXPY for "other goods" exports increased by such large amounts? It is conceivable, with trade fragmentation, that part of the large increase in the EXPY for exports was led by the increase in the IMPY for imports. Several studies find that foreign content in some countries' exports has increased over time (for examples of this phenomenon, see Hummels, Ishii, and Yi, 2001; and Dean, Fung, and Zhi, 2008) . Our results also show that the imported intermediates have also increased in productivity level, as measured by IMPY, something that has received little attention in the literature (see Figure IV .7). India is the only country where IMPY does not have a strong positive trend during the period (which may be related to its poor performance in the EXPY for "other goods" exports). By the end of the period, the countries with the lowest IMPY for intermediate imports were India, Hong Kong, and China.
China, however, began to experience a large increase in IMPY toward the end of the 1990s. For the most part, it appears that the IMPY for other imports is fairly constant (see Figure IV .8). It is noteworthy that most of the Asian countries in the sample had IMPY levels for imports that were at the same technological level during the whole period and that "other goods" imports into Hong Kong and Japan were significantly less technologically advanced that those of the other countries.
[ Figure What role has FDI played in this technological upgrading? FDI is arguably a key driver of trade fragmentation. In China, for example, foreign invested enterprises perform the majority of processing trade (trade that uses imported intermediates) and do very little in regular trade (Dean, Lovely, and Mora, 2009 The correlation between IMPY and FDI inflows (as a percent of GDP) is not as strong, nor as significant, as the correlation between EXPY and FDI inflows. It is interesting to note that, in contrast to the findings for EXPY, the correlation is not significant for the less developed
Asian economies of our sample. The correlation for intermediate imports is fairly strong, positive, and significant for Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, and Singapore. The correlation between IMPY for "other goods" imports and FDI inflows is only significant in two cases: Singapore and Thailand, and it is negative in the latter case. The fact that the correlation is negative and significant for Thailand is perplexing (especially because the correlations were strong, positive, and significant for EXPY).
The heterogeneity of the correlations among the sample of countries is presumably a result of how important FDI is to each country and the sectors targeted by the FDI inflows. For example, FDI may be complementary to certain types of trade, and a substitute for others. The latter happens when FDI is motivated by the desire to reduce trade costs of exporting to the host country. On the other hand, if FDI is motivated by setting up production for exporting, then FDI and exports can move together. 11 In these kinds of models or empirical exercises, trade effects are measured in terms of quantitative impacts. On the other hand, the focus of the analysis here is on the complexity or productivity of trade. The correlations in Table IV .2 indicate that the higher income countries in the sample tend to have higher FDI being associated with more complex intermediate goods imports: these might be sophisticated engineering equipment, for example.
For the lower income countries in the sample, the export impacts are more pronounced. In both cases, however, there is still unexplained variation across countries with similar income levels.
V. Conclusion
In reviewing the development experience of several Asian economies, specifically with respect to their FDI, trade fragmentation and trade upgrading, we find that these countries have been relatively successful at upgrading the productivity level of their exports and their intermediate imports. Although we do not identify the causal link, it is clear that export and import productivity levels are highly correlated with GDP per capita. Whatever the causal link may be, we find that, for the Asian economies in our sample, intermediate export productivity levels are converging; there are many successful cases of improved final goods export productivity levels; and there are strong positive trends for intermediate import productivity levels.
FDI may arguably be a driver for the upgrading of trade productivity levels, but the role varies by country. In general, for the less developed Asian economies in our sample, we find that FDI is highly correlated with the increases in productivity growth in exports. For the more developed Asian economies, however, this correlation tends to be higher for increases in productivity of intermediate imports. 
